In this talk, we address mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games—a setting using which many emerging problems in electricity markets can be readily modeled. We introduce the notion of dominant strategy non-bankrupting equilibrium (DNBE) which requires players to make very few assumptions about the behaviors of other players in order to employ their equilibrium strategy. Consequently, a mechanism that renders truth-telling a DNBE could be quite effective in molding real-world behavior along truthful lines. We present a mechanism for two-stage repeated stochastic games that renders truth-telling a DNBE.
Prof. Bharadwaj Satchidanandan is an Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering at the Indian Institute of Technology Madras. Before this, he was a postdoctoral researcher at the Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where he was hosted by Prof. Munther A. Dahleh. He obtained his Ph.D. from Texas A&M University where he was advised by Prof. P. R. Kumar. His research interests include cyber-physical systems, security, renewable energy, game theory, mechanism design, communications, control, networks, etc.